Online Reputation and Polling Systems: Data Incest, Social Learning and
  Revealed Preferences by Krishnamurthy, Vikram & Hoiles, William
1Online Reputation and Polling Systems: Data
Incest, Social Learning and Revealed
Preferences
Vikram Krishnamurthy, Fellow, IEEE William Hoiles, Student Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper considers online reputation and
polling systems where individuals make recommendations
based on their private observations and recommendations
of friends. Such interaction of individuals and their social
influence is modelled as social learning on a directed acyclic
graph. Data incest (misinformation propagation) occurs
due to unintentional re-use of identical actions in the for-
mation of public belief in social learning; the information
gathered by each agent is mistakenly considered to be
independent. This results in overconfidence and bias in
estimates of the state. Necessary and sufficient conditions
are given on the structure of information exchange graph
to mitigate data incest. Incest removal algorithms are
presented. Experimental results on human subjects are
presented to illustrate the effect of social influence and
data incest on decision making. These experimental results
indicate that social learning protocols require careful design
to handle and mitigate data incest. The incest removal
algorithms are illustrated in an expectation polling system
where participants in a poll respond with a summary of
their friends’ beliefs. Finally, the principle of revealed
preferences arising in micro-economics theory is used
to parse Twitter datasets to determine if social sensors
are utility maximizers and then determine their utility
functions.
Keywords: social learning, data incest, reputation sys-
tems, Bayesian estimation, expectation polling, Afriat’s
theorem, revealed preferences
I. INTRODUCTION
Online reputation systems (Yelp, Tripadvisor, etc.) are
of increasing importance in measuring social opinion.
They can be viewed as sensors of social opinion - they
go beyond physical sensors since user opinions/ratings
(such as human evaluation of a restaurant or movie) are
impossible to measure via physical sensors. Devising
a fair online reputation system involves constructing a
data fusion system that combines estimates of individuals
to generate an unbiased estimate. This presents unique
V. Krishnamurthy (e-mail: vikramk@ece.ubc.ca) and W. Hoiles
(email: whoiles@ece.ubc.ca) are with the Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, University of British Columbia, Vancouver,
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Parts of Sec.I and II of this paper appear in our tutorial paper [1].
challenges from a statistical signal processing and data
fusion point of view. First, humans interact with and
influence other humans since ratings posted on online
reputation systems strongly influence the behavior of
individuals.1 This can result in non-standard information
patterns due to correlations introduced by the structure
of the underlying social network. Second, due to pri-
vacy concerns, humans rarely reveal raw observations
of the underlying state of nature. Instead, they reveal
their decisions (ratings, recommendations, votes) which
can be viewed as a low resolution (quantized) function
of their raw measurements and interactions with other
individuals.
Motivation
This paper models how data incest propagates
amongst individuals in online reputation and polling
systems. Consider the following example comprising a
multi-agent system where agents seek to estimate an
underlying state of nature. An agent visits a restaurant
and obtains a noisy private measurement of the state
(quality of food). She then rates the restaurant as excel-
lent on an online reputation website. Another agent is
influenced by this rating, visits the restaurant, and also
gives a good rating on the online reputation website.
The first agent visits the reputation site and notices that
another agent has also given the restaurant a good rating
- this double confirms her rating and she enters another
good rating. In a fair reputation system, such “double
counting” or “data incest” should have been prevented
by making the first agent aware that the rating of the
second agent was influenced by her own rating. The
information exchange between the agents is represented
by the directed graph of Fig.1. The fact that there are
two distinct paths (denoted in red) between Agent 1 at
time 1 and Agent 1 at time 3 implies that the information
of Agent 1 at time 1 is double counted thereby leading
181% of hotel managers regularly check Tripadvisor reviews [2]. A
one-star increase in the Yelp rating maps to 5-9 % revenue increase [3].
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to a data incest event. Such data incest results in a bias
in the estimate of the underlying state.
Fig. 1. Example of the information flow in a social network with two
agents and over three event epochs. The arrows represent exchange of
information.
Main Results and Organization
This paper has four parts. The first part, namely Sec.II,
deals with the design of a fair online reputation system.
Sec.II formulates the data incest problem in a multi agent
system where individual agents perform social learning
and exchange information on a sequence of directed
acyclic graphs. The aim is to develop a distributed
data fusion protocol which incorporates social influence
constraints and provides an unbiased estimate of the
state of nature at each node. Protocol 1 in Sec.II-D
gives the complete design template of how incest can be
avoided in the online reputation system. It is shown that
by choosing the costs to satisfy reasonable conditions,
the recommendations made by individuals are ordinal
functions of their private observations and monotone
in the prior information. This means that the Bayesian
social learning follows simple intuitive rules and is
therefore, a useful idealization. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for exact incest removal subject to a social
influence constraint are given.
The second part of the paper, namely Sec.III, analyzes
the data of an actual experiment that we performed on
human subjects to determine how social influence affects
decision making. In particular, information flow patterns
from the experimental data indicative of social learning
and data incest are described. The experimental results
illustrate the effect of social influence.
The third part of the paper, namely Sec.IV, describes
how the data incest problem formulation and incest
removal algorithms can be applied to an expectation
polling system. Polls seek to estimate the fraction of
a population that support a political party, executive
decision, etc. In intent polling, individuals are sampled
and asked who they intend to vote for. In expectation
polling [4] individuals are sampled and asked who
they believe will win the election. It is intuitive that
expectation polling is more accurate than intent polling;
since in expectation polling an individual considers its
own intent together with the intents of its friends.2 If
the average degree of nodes in the network is d, then
the savings in the number of samples is by a factor of
d, since a randomly chosen node summarizes the results
form d of its friends. However, the variance and bias of
the estimate depend on the social network structure, and
data incest can strongly bias the estimate. We illustrate
how the posterior distribution of the leading candidate in
the poll can be estimated based on incestious estimates.
Social learning assumes that agents (social sensors)
choose their actions by maximizing a utility function.
The final part of the paper, namely Sec.V, uses the
principle of revealed preferences as a constructive test
to determine: Are social sensors utility optimizers in
their response to external influence? We present a re-
markable result arising in microeconomics theory called
Afriat’s theorem [5], [6] which provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for a finite dataset D to have
originated from a utility maximizer. The result is il-
lustrated by tracking real-time tweets and retweets for
reputation based review Twitter accounts. In particular,
Sec.V shows that social learning associated with rep-
utation agencies has the structure illustrated in Fig.2.
That is, the sentiment of tweets and number of followers
(reputation) constitute the publicly available information
that drives the social learning process. If the sentiment of
the tweet published by the reputation agency improves
its reputation, then this reinforces the reputation agency’s
belief that it adequately reviewed the content. This is an
example of data incest.
Content
Reputation
Agency
Social Learning
in
Twitter
sentiment
reputation
Fig. 2. Schematic of dynamics of the reputation agency and the
Twitter network. Content (i.e. games, movies, books) is provided to
the reputation agency which then publishes its review as a tweet.
The Twitter network then responds to the sentiment of this tweet by
retweeting. This may increase or decrease the reputation of the agency.
Related work
[7] is a seminal paper in collective human behavior.
The book [8] contains a complete treatment of social
2[4] analyzes all US presidential electoral college results from 1952-
2008 where both intention and expectation polling were conducted and
shows a remarkable result: In 77 cases where expectation and intent
polling pointed to different winners, expectation polling was accurate
78% of the time! The dataset from the American National Election
Studies comprised of voter responses to two questions:
Intention: Who will you vote for in the election for President?
Expectation: Who do you think will be elected President in November?
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learning models. Social learning has been used widely in
economics, marketing, political science and sociology to
model the behavior of financial markets, crowds, social
groups and social networks; see [9], [10], [11], [8] and
numerous references therein. Related models have been
studied in sequential decision making [12] and statistical
signal processing [13], [1]. A tutorial exposition of social
learning in and sensing is given in our recent paper [1].
Online reputation systems are reviewed and studied in
[14], [15], [16]. Information caused by influential agents
is investigated in [10], [17]. In [18] examples are given
that show that if just 10% of the population holds and
unshakable belief, their belief will be adopted by the
majority of society.
The role of social influence in decision making (which
we consider in Sec.II-C) is studied in [19]. The expec-
tation polling [4] (which we consider in Sec.IV) is a
form of social sampling [20] where participants in a poll
respond with a summary of their friends responses. [20]
analyzes the effect of the social network structure on the
bias and variance of expectation polls. Social sampling
has interesting parallels with the so called Keynesian
beauty contest, see for example https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Keynesian beauty contest for a discussion.
Data incest arises in other areas of electrical engineer-
ing. The so called the count to infinity problem in the
distance vector routing protocol in packet switched net-
works [21] is a type of misinformation propagation. Data
incest also arises in Belief Propagation (BP) algorithms
in computer vision and error-correcting coding theory.
BP algorithms require passing local messages over the
graph (Bayesian network) at each iteration. For graphical
models with loops, BP algorithms are only approximate
due to the over-counting of local messages [22] which is
similar to data incest. The algorithms presented in this
paper can remove data incest in Bayesian social learning
over non-tree graphs that satisfy a topological constraint.
In [17], data incest is considered in a network where
agents exchange their private belief states (without social
learning). Simpler versions were studied in [23], [24].
Regarding revealed preferences, highly influential
works in the economics literature include those by Afriat
[5], [25] and Varian (chief economist at Google). In
particular Varian’s work includes measuring the welfare
effect of price discrimination [26], analysing the rela-
tionship between prices of broadband Internet access
and time of use service [27], and auctions for adver-
tisement position placement on page search results from
Google [27], [28].
Perspective
In Bayesian estimation, the twin effects of so-
cial learning (information aggregation with interaction
amongst agents) and data incest (misinformation prop-
agation) lead to non-standard information patterns in
estimating the underlying state of nature. Herding occurs
when the public belief overrides the private observations
and thus actions of agents are independent of their
private observations. Data incest results in bias in the
public belief as a consequence of the unintentional re-
use of identical actions in the formation of public belief
in social learning; the information gathered by each agent
is mistakenly considered to be independent. This results
in overconfidence and bias in estimates of the state.
Privacy and reputation pose conflicting requirements:
privacy requirements result in noisier measurements or
lower resolution actions (since individuals are not willing
to disclose private observations), while a high degree
of reputation requires accurate measurements. Utility
functions, noisy private measurements and quantized
actions are essential ingredients of the social learning
models presented in this paper that facilitate modeling
this tradeoff between reputation and privacy.
II. REPUTATION DYNAMICS AND DATA INCEST
A. Classical Social Learning
Consider a multi-agent system that aims to estimate
the state of an underlying finite state random variable
x ∈ X = {1, 2, . . . , X} with known prior distribution
pi0. Each agent acts once in a predetermined sequential
order indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . Assume at the beginning
of iteration k, all agents have access to the public belief
pik−1 defined in Step (iv) below. The social learning
protocol proceeds as follows [9], [8]:
(i) Private Observation: At time k, agent k records
a private observation yk ∈ Y from the observation
distribution Biy = P (y|x = i), i ∈ X. Throughout this
paper we assume that Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y } is finite.
(ii) Private Belief: Using the public belief pik−1 available
at time k−1 (Step (iv) below), agent k updates its private
posterior belief ηk(i) = P (xk = i|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk)
using Bayes formula:
ηk =
Bykpi
1′XBypi
, Byk = diag(P (yk|x = i), i ∈ X). (1)
Here 1X denotes the X-dimensional vector of ones, ηk
is an X-dimensional probability mass function (pmf).
(iii) Myopic Action: Agent k takes action ak ∈ A =
{1, 2, . . . , A} to minimize its expected cost
ak = arg min
a∈A
E{c(x, a)|a1, . . . , ak−1, yk}
= arg min
a∈A
{c′aηk}. (2)
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Here ca = (c(i, a), i ∈ X) denotes an X dimensional
cost vector, and c(i, a) denotes the cost incurred when
the underlying state is i and the agent chooses action a.
(iv) Social Learning Filter: Given the action ak of agent
k, and the public belief pik−1, each subsequent agent
k′ > k performs social learning to update the public
belief pik according to the “social learning filter”:
pik = T (pik−1, ak), where T (pi, a) =
Rpia pi
σ(pi, a)
, (3)
where σ(pi, a) = 1′XR
pi
aP
′pi is the normalization factor
of the Bayesian update. In (3), the public belief pik(i) =
P (xk = i|a1, . . . ak) and Rpia = diag(P (a|x = i, pi), i ∈
X) has elements
P (ak = a|xk = i, pik−1 = pi) =
∑
y∈Y
P (a|y, pi)P (y|xk = i)
P (ak = a|y, pi) =
{
1 if c′aByP
′pi ≤ c′a˜ByP ′pi, a˜ ∈ A
0 otherwise.
The following result which is well known in the
economics literature [9], [8]:
Theorem 2.1 ([9]): The social learning protocol leads
to an information cascade3 in finite time with probabil-
ity 1. That is, after some finite time k¯ social learning
ceases and the public belief pik+1 = pik, k ≥ k¯, and all
agents choose the same action ak+1 = ak, k ≥ k¯. 
B. Information Exchange Model
In comparison to the previous subsection, we now
consider social learning on a family of time dependent
directed acyclic graphs - in such cases, apart from
herding, the phenomenon of data incest arises.
Consider an online reputation system comprised of
agents {1, 2, . . . , S} that aim to estimate an underlying
state of nature (a random variable). Let x ∈ X =
{1, 2, . . . , X} represent the state of nature (such as the
quality of a restaurant/hotel) with known prior distribu-
tion pi0. Let k = 1, 2, 3, . . . depict epochs at which events
occur. The index k marks the historical order of events
and not absolute time. For simplicity, we refer to k as
“time”.
It is convenient also to reduce the coordinates of time
k and agent s to a single integer index n:
n , s+S(k−1), s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, k = 1, 2, 3, . . . (4)
3 A herd of agents takes place at time k¯, if the actions of all agents
after time k¯ are identical, i.e., ak = ak¯ for all time k > k¯. An
information cascade implies that a herd of agents occur. [29] quotes the
following anecdote of user influence and herding in a social network:
“... when a popular blogger left his blogging site for a two-week
vacation, the site’s visitor tally fell, and content produced by three
invited substitute bloggers could not stem the decline.”
We refer to n as a “node” of a time dependent informa-
tion flow graph Gn which we now define. Let
Gn = (Vn, En), n = 1, 2, . . . (5)
denote a sequence of time-dependent directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs)4 of information flow in the social net-
work until and including time k. Each vertex in Vn
represents an agent s′ at time k′ and each edge (n′, n′′)
in En ⊆ Vn×Vn shows that the information (action) of
node n′ (agent s′ at time k′) reaches node n′′ (agent s′′
at time k′′). It is clear that Gn is a sub-graph of Gn+1.
The Adjacency Matrix An of Gn is an n× n matrix
with elements An(i, j) given by
An(i, j) =
{
1 if (vj , vi) ∈ E ,
0 otherwise
, An(i, i) = 0. (6)
The transitive closure matrix Tn is the n× n matrix
Tn = sgn((In −An)−1) (7)
where for matrix M , the matrix sgn(M) has elements
sgn(M)(i, j) =
{
0 if M(i, j) = 0 ,
1 if M(i, j) 6= 0.
Note that An(i, j) = 1 if there is a single hop path
between nodes i and j, In comparison, Tn(i, j) = 1 if
there exists a path (possible multi-hop) between i and j.
The information reaching node n depends on the
information flow graph Gn. The following two sets will
be used to specify the incest removal algorithms below:
Hn = {m : An(m,n) = 1} (8)
Fn = {m : Tn(m,n) = 1}. (9)
Thus Hn denotes the set of previous nodes m that com-
municate with node n in a single-hop. In comparison, Fn
denotes the set of previous nodes m whose information
eventually arrives at node n. Thus Fn contains all
possible multi-hop connections by which information
from a node m eventually reaches node n.
Properties of An and Tn: Due to causality with
respect to the time index k (information sent by an agent
can only arrive at another agent at a later time instant),
the following obvious properties hold (proof omitted):
Lemma 2.1: Consider the sequence of DAGs Gn,
n = 1, 2, . . .
(i) The adjacency matrices An are upper triangular.
An is the upper left n× n submatrix of An+1.
(ii) The transitive closure matrices Tn are upper triangu-
lar with ones on the diagonal. Hence, Tn is invertible.
4A DAG is a directed graph with no directed cycles. The ordering of
nodes n = 1, 2, . . . , proposed here is a special case of the well known
result that the nodes of a DAG are partially orderable; see Sec.IV.
4
(iii) Classical social learning of Sec.II-A, is a trivial
example with adjacency matrix An(i, j) = 1 for j = i+1
and An(i, j) = 0 elsewhere. 
The appendix contains an example of data incest that
illustrates the above notation.
C. Data Incest Model and Social Influence Constraint
Each node n receives recommendations from its im-
mediate friends (one hop neighbors) according to the
information flow graph defined above. That is, it receives
actions {am,m ∈ Hn} from nodes m ∈ Hn and
then seeks to compute the associated public beliefs
pim,m ∈ Hn. If node n naively (incorrectly) assumes
that the public beliefs pim,m ∈ Hn are independent,
then it would fuse these as
pin− =
∏
m∈Hn pim
1′X
∏
m∈Hn pim
. (10)
This naive data fusion would result in data incest.
1) Aim: The aim is to provide each node n the true
posterior distribution
pi0n−(i) = P (x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}) (11)
subject to the following social influence constraint:
There exists a fusion algorithm A such that
pi0n− = A(pim,m ∈ Hn). (12)
2) Discussion. Fair Rating and Social Influence: We
briefly pause to discuss (11) and (12).
(i) We call pi0n− in (11) the true or fair online rating
available to node n since Fn defined in (9) denotes
all information (multi-hop links) available to node n.
By definition pi0n− is incest free and is the desired
conditional probability that agent n needs. 5
Indeed, if node n combines pi0n− together with its own
private observation via social learning, then clearly
ηn(i) = P (x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}, yn), i ∈ X,
pin(i) = P (x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}, an), i ∈ X,
are, respectively, the correct (incest free) private belief
for node n and the correct after-action public belief. If
agent n does not use pi0n−, then incest can propagate; for
example if agent n naively uses (10).
Why should an individual n agree to use pi0n− to com-
bine with its private message? It is here that the social
5For the reader unfamiliar with Bayesian state estimation: Com-
puting the posterior pi0n− is crucial noisy observations. Then the
conditional mean estimate is evaluated as E{x|{am,m ∈ Fn}} =∑
x∈X xpi
0
n−(x) and is the minimum variance estimate, i.e., optimal
in the mean square error sense and more generally in the Bregmann
loss function sense. The conditional mean is a ‘soft’ estimate and is
unbiased by definition. Alternatively the maximum aposteriori ‘hard’
estimate is evaluated as argmaxx pi
0
n−(x).
influence constraint (12) is important. Hn can be viewed
as the “social message”, i.e., personal friends of node n
since they directly communicate to node n, while the
associated beliefs can be viewed as the “informational
message”. As described in the remarkable recent paper
[19], the social message from personal friends exerts a
large social influence6 – it provides significant incentive
(peer pressure) for individual n to comply with the
protocol of combining its estimate with pi0n− and thereby
prevent incest. [19] shows that receiving messages from
known friends has significantly more influence on an
individual than the information in the messages. This
study includes a comparison of information messages
and social messages on Facebook and their direct effect
on voting behavior. To quote [19], “The effect of social
transmission on real-world voting was greater than the
direct effect of the messages themselves...” In Sec.III,
we provide results of an experiment on human subjects
that also illustrates social influence in social learning.
D. Fair Online Reputation System: Protocol 1
The procedure specified in Protocol 1 evaluates the
fair online rating by eliminating data incest in a social
network. The aim is to achieve (11) subject to (12).
At this stage, the public rating pin− computed in (13)
of Protocol 1 is not necessarily the fair online rating pi0n−
of (11). Without careful design of algorithm A in (13),
due to inter-dependencies of actions on previous actions,
pin− can be substantially different from pi0n−. Then ηn
computed via (15) will not be the correct private belief
and incest will propagate in the network. In other words,
ηn, pin− and pin are defined purely in terms of their
computational expressions in Protocol 1; they are not
necessarily the desired conditional probabilities, unless
algorithm A is properly designed to remove incest. Note
also the requirement that algorithm A needs to satisfy
the social influence constraint (12).
E. Ordinal Decision Making in Protocol 1
Protocol 1 assumes that each agent is a Bayesian
utility optimizer. The following discussion shows that
under reasonable conditions, such a Bayesian model is
a useful idealization of agents’ behaviors.
Humans typically make monotone decisions - the
more favorable the private observation, the higher the
6In a study conducted by social networking site myYearbook, 81% of
respondents said they had received advice from friends and followers
relating to a product purchase through a social site; 74 percent of those
who received such advice found it to be influential in their decision.
(Click Z, January 2010).
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Protocol 1 Incest Removal in Online Reputation System
(i) Information from Social Network:
1) Social Message from Friends: Node n receives
social message Hn comprising the names or photos
of friends that have made recommendations.
2) Informational Message from Friends: The reputa-
tion system fuses recommendations {am,m ∈ Hn}
into the single informational message pin− and
presents this to node n.
The reputation system computes pin− as follows:
a) {am,m ∈ Hn} are used to compute public
beliefs {pim,m ∈ Hn} using Step (v) below.
b) {pim,m ∈ Hn} are fused into pin− as
pin− = A(pim,m ∈ Hn). (13)
In Sec.II-G, fusion algorithm A is designed as
ln−(i) =
∑
m∈Hn
wn(m) lm(i), i ∈ X. (14)
Here lm(i) = log pim(i) and wn(m) are weights.
(ii) Observation: Node n records private observation yn
from the distribution Biy = P (y|x = i), i ∈ X.
(iii) Private Belief: Node n uses yn and informational
message pin− to update its private belief via Bayes rule:
ηn =
Bynpin−
1′XBypin−
. (15)
(iv) Recommendation: Node n makes recommendation
an = arg min
a
c′aηn
and records this on the reputation system.
(v) Public Belief Update by Network Administrator:
Based on recommendation an, the reputation system
(automated algorithm) computes the public belief pin
using the social learning filter (3).
recommendation. Humans make ordinal decisions7 since
humans tend to think in symbolic ordinal terms. Under
what conditions is the recommendation an made by node
n monotone increasing in its observation yn and ordinal?
Recall from Steps (iii) and (iv) of Protocol 1 that the
recommendation of node n is
an(pi
0
n−, yn) = argmina c
′
aBynpi
0
n−
So an equivalent question is: Under what conditions
is the argmin increasing in observation yn? Note
7Humans typically convert numerical attributes to ordinal scales
before making decisions. For example, it does not matter if the cost
of a meal at a restaurant is $200 or $205; an individual would classify
this cost as “high”. Also credit rating agencies use ordinal symbols
such as AAA, AA, A.
that an increasing argmin is an ordinal property -
that is, argmina c
′
aBynpi
0
n− increasing in y implies
argmina φ(c
′
aBynpi
0
n−) is also increasing in y for any
monotone function φ(·).
The following result gives sufficient conditions for
each agent to give a recommendation that is monotone
and ordinal in its private observation:
Theorem 2.2: Suppose the observation probabilities
and costs satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) Biy are TP2 (totally positive of order 2); that is,
Bi+1,yBi,y+1 ≤ Bi,yBi+1,y+1.
(A2) c(x, a) is submodular. That is, c(x, a + 1) −
c(x, a) ≤ c(x+ 1, a+ 1)− c(x+ 1, a).
Then
1) Under (A1) and (A2), the recommendation
an(pi
0
n−, yn) made by agent n is increasing and
hence ordinal in observation yn, for any pi0n−.
2) Under (A2), an(pi0n−, yn) is increasing in belief
pi0n− with respect to the monotone likelihood ratio
(MLR) stochastic order8 for any observation yn.
The proof is in the appendix. We can interpret the
above theorem as follows. If agents makes recommen-
dations that are monotone and ordinal in the observations
and monotone in the prior, then they mimic the Bayesian
social learning model. Even if the agent does not exactly
follow a Bayesian social learning model, its monotone
ordinal behavior implies that such a Bayesian model is
a useful idealization.
Condition (A1) is widely studied in monotone decision
making; see the classical book by Karlin [30] and
[31]; numerous examples of noise distributions are TP2.
Indeed in the highly cited paper [32] in the economics
literature, observation y+1 is said to be more “favorable
news” than observation y if Condition (A1) holds.
Condition (A2) is the well known submodularity
condition [33]. Actually (A2) is a stronger version of
the more general single-crossing condition [34], [35]
stemming from the economics literature (see appendix)
(ca+1 − ca)′By+1pi0 ≥ 0 =⇒ (ca+1 − ca)′Bypi0 ≥ 0.
This single crossing condition is ordinal, since for any
monotone function φ, it is equivalent to
φ((ca+1−ca)′By+1pi0) ≥ 0 =⇒ φ((ca+1−ca)′Bypi0) ≥ 0.
(A2) also makes sense in a reputation system for the
costs to be well posed. Suppose the recommendations in
action set A are arranged in increasing order and also
the states in X for the underlying state are arranged in
ascending order. Then (A2) says: if recommendation a+
1 is more accurate than recommendation a for state x;
8 Given probability mass functions {pi} and {qi}, i = 1, . . . , X
then p MLR dominates q if log pi − log pi+1 ≤ log qi − log qi+1.
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then recommendation a + 1 is also more accurate than
recommendation a for state x + 1 (which is a higher
quality state than x).
In the experiment results reported in Sec.III, we found
that (A1) and (A2) of Theorem 2.2 are justified.
F. Discussion and Properties of Protocol 1
For the reader’s convenience we provide an illustrative
example of data incest in the appendix. We now discuss
several other properties of Protocol 1.
1) Individuals have selective memory: Protocol 1
allows for cases where each node can remember some
(or all) of its past actions or none. This models cases
where people forget most of the past except for specific
highlights. For example, in the information flow graph of
the illustrative example in the appendix (Fig.13), if nodes
1,3,4 and 7 are assumed to be the same individual, then
at node 7, the individual remembers what happened at
node 5 and node 1, but not node 3.
2) Security: Network and Data Administrator: The
social influence constraint (12) can be viewed as a
separation of privilege requirement for network security.
For example, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce [36, Sec.2.4] recommends separating the roles
of data and systems administrator. Protocol 1 can then
be interpreted as follows: A network administrator has
access to the social network graph (but not the data) and
can compute weights wn(m) (13) by which the estimates
are weighed. A data administrator has access to the rec-
ommendations of friends (but not to the social network).
Combining the weights with the recommendations yields
the informational message pi0n−1 as in (14).
3) Automated Recommender System: Steps (i) and (v)
of Protocol 1 can be combined into an automated rec-
ommender system that maps previous actions of agents
in the social group to a single recommendation (rating)
pin− of (13). This recommender system can operate
completely opaquely to the actual user (node n). Node
n simply uses the automated rating pin− as the current
best available rating from the reputation system. Actually
Algorithm A presented below fuses the beliefs in a linear
fashion. A human node n receiving an informational
message comprised of a linear combination of recom-
mendation of friends, along with the social message has
incentive to follow the protocol as described in Sec.II-C.
4) Agent Reputation: The cost function minimization
in Step (iv) can be interpreted in terms of the reputation
of agents in online reputation systems. If an agent con-
tinues to write bad reviews for high quality restaurants
on Yelp, her reputation becomes lower among the users.
Consequently, other people ignore reviews of that (low-
reputation) agent in evaluating their opinions about the
social unit under study (restaurant). Therefore, agents
minimize the penalty of writing inaccurate reviews.
G. Incest Removal Algorithm A
It only remains to describe the construction of algo-
rithm A in Step 2b of Protocol 1 so that
pin−(i) = pi0n−(i), i ∈ X
where pi0n−(i) = P (x = i|{am,m ∈ Fn}). (16)
To describe algorithm A, we make the following def-
initions: Recall pi0n− in (11) is the fair online rating
available to node n. It is convenient to work with the
logarithm of the un-normalized belief: accordingly define
ln(i) ∝ log pin(i), ln−(i) ∝ log pin−(i), i ∈ X.
Define the n− 1 dimensional weight vector:
wn = T
−1
n−1tn. (17)
Recall that tn denotes the first n − 1 elements of the
nth column of the transitive closure matrix Tn. Thus the
weights are purely a function of the adjacency matrix of
the graph and do not depend on the observed data.
We present algorithm A in two steps: first, the actual
computation is given in Theorem 2.3, second, necessary
and sufficient conditions on the information flow graph
for the existence of such an algorithm to achieve the
social influence constraint (12).
Theorem 2.3 (Fair Rating Algorithm): Consider the
reputation system with Protocol 1. Suppose the network
administrator runs the following algorithm in (13):
ln−(i) =
n−1∑
m=1
wn(m) lm(i) (18)
where the weights wn are chosen according to (17).
Then ln−(i) ∝ log pi0n−(i). That is, the fair rating
log pi0n−(i) defined in (11) is obtained via (18). 
Theorem 2.3 says that the fair rating pi0n− can be ex-
pressed as a linear function of the action log-likelihoods
in terms of the transitive closure matrix Tn of graph Gn.
Achievability of Fair Rating by Protocol 1:
1) Algorithm A at node n specified by (13) needs to
satisfy the social influence constraint (12) - that is,
it needs to operate on beliefs lm,m ∈ Hn.
2) On the other hand, to provide incest free estimates,
algorithm A specified in (18) requires all previous
beliefs l1:n−1(i) that are specified by the non-zero
elements of the vector wn.
The only way to reconcile points 1 and 2 is to ensure that
An(j, n) = 0 implies wn(j) = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n − 1.
This condition means that the single hop past estimates
lm,m ∈ Hn available at node n according to (13)
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in Protocol 1 provide all the information required to
compute w′n l1:n−1 in (18). We formalize this condition
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4 (Achievability of Fair Rating):
Consider the fair rating algorithm specified by (18).
For Protocol 1 using the social influence constraint
information (pim,m ∈ Hn) to achieve the estimates ln−
of algorithm (18), a necessary and sufficient condition
on the information flow graph Gn is
An(j, n) = 0 =⇒ wn(j) = 0. (19)
Therefore for Protocol 1 to generate incest free estimates
for nodes n = 1, 2, . . ., condition (19) needs to hold for
each n. (Recall wn is specified in (18).) 
Summary: Algorithm (18) together with the condition
(19) ensure that incest free estimates are generated by
Protocol 1 that satisfy social influence constraint (12).
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON HUMAN SUBJECTS
To illustrate social learning, data incest and social
influence, this section presents an actual psychology
experiment that was conducted by our colleagues at
the Department of Psychology of University of British
Columbia in September and October, 2013, see [37]
for details. The participants comprised 36 undergraduate
students who participated in the experiment for course
credit.
A. Experiment Setup
The experimental study involved 1658 individual tri-
als. Each trial comprised two participants who were
asked to perform a perceptual task interactively. The
perceptual task was as follows: Two arrays of circles
denoted left and right, were given to each pair of
participants. Each participant was asked to judge which
array (left or right) had the larger average diameter. The
participants answer (left of right) constituted their action.
So the action space is A = {0 (left), 1 (right)}.
The circles were prepared for each trial as follows:
two 4× 4 grids of circles were generated by uniformly
sampling from the radii: {20, 24, 29, 35, 42} (in pixels).
The average diameter of each grid was computed, and
if the means differed by more than 8% or less than 4%,
new grids were made. Thus in each trial, the left array
and right array of circles differed in the average diameter
by 4-8%
For each trial, one of the two participants was chosen
randomly to start the experiment by choosing an action
according to his/her observation. Thereafter, each partici-
pant was given access to their partner’s previous response
(action) and the participants own previous action prior to
making his/her judgment. This mimics the social learn-
ing Protocol 1 of Sec.II-D. The participants continued
choosing actions according to this procedure until the
experiment terminated. The trial terminated when the
response of each of the two participants did not change
for three successive iterations (the two participants did
not necessarily have to agree for the trial to terminate).
In each trial, the actions of participants were recorded
along with the time interval taken to choose their action.
As an example, Fig. 4 illustrates the sample path of
decisions made by the two participants in one of the
1658 trials. In this specific trial, the average diameter of
the left array of circles was 32.1875 and the right array
was 30.5625 (in pixels); so the ground truth was 0 (left).
Fig. 3. Two arrays of circles were given to each pair of participants
on a screen. Their task is to interactively determine which side (either
left or right) had the larger average diameter. The partner’s previous
decision was displayed on screen prior to the stimulus.
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Fig. 4. Example of sample path of actions chosen by two participants
in a single trial of the experiment. In this trial, both participants
eventually chose the correct answer 0 (left).
B. Experimental Results
The results of our experimental study are as follows:
1) Social learning Model: As mentioned above, the
experiment for each pair of participants was continued
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until both participants’ responses stabilized. In what per-
centage of these experiments, did an agreement occur be-
tween the two participants? The answer to this question
reveals whether “herding” occurred in the experiments
and whether the participants performed social learning
(influenced by their partners). The experiments show that
in 66% of trials (1102 among 1658), participants reached
an agreement; that is herding occurred. Further, in 32%
of the trials, both participants converged to the correct
decision after a few interactions.
To construct a social learning model for the exper-
imental data, we consider the experiments where both
participants reached an agreement. Define the social
learning success rate as
# expts where both participants chose correct answer
# expts where both participants reached an agreement
·
In the experimental study, the state space is X = {0, 1}
where x = 0, when the left array of circles has the
larger diameter and x = 1, when the right array has the
larger diameter. The initial belief for both participants is
considered to be pi0 = [0.5, 0.5]. The observation space
is assumed to be Y = {0, 1}.
To estimate the social learning model parameters
(observation probabilities Biy and costs c(i, a)), we de-
termined the parameters that best fit the learning success
rate of the experimental data. The best fit parameters
obtained were9
Biy =
[
0.61 0.39
0.41 0.59
]
, c(i, a) =
[
0 2
2 0
]
.
Note that Biy and c(i, a) satisfy both the conditions of
the Theorem 2.2, namely TP2 observation probabilities
and single-crossing cost. This implies that the subjects of
this experiment made monotone and ordinal decisions.
2) Data incest: Here, we study the effect of informa-
tion patterns in the experimental study that can result
in data incest. Since private observations are highly
subjective and participants did not document these, we
cannot claim with certainty if data incest changed the
action of an individual. However, from the experimental
data, we can localize specific information patterns that
can result in incest. In particular, we focus on the two
information flow graphs depicted in Fig.5. In the two
graphs of Fig.5, the action of the first participant at time
k influenced the action of the second participant at time
k+ 1, and thus, could have been double counted by the
first participant at time k + 2. We found that in 79% of
experiments, one of the information patterns shown in
9Parameter estimation in social learning is a challenging problem not
addressed in this paper. Due to the formation of cascades in finite time,
construction of an asymptotically consistent estimator is impossible,
since actions after the formation of a cascade contain no information.
Fig.5 occurred (1303 out of 1658 experiments). Further,
in 21% of experiments, the information patterns shown
in Fig.5 occurred and at least one participant changed
his/her decision, i.e., the judgment of participant at time
k+1 differed from his/her judgments at time k+2 and k.
These results show that even for experiments involving
two participants, data incest information patterns occur
frequently (79%) and causes individuals to modify their
actions (21%). It shows that social learning protocols
require careful design to handle and mitigate data incest.
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Fig. 5. Two information patterns from our experimental studies which
can result in data incest.
IV. BELIEF-BASED EXPECTATION POLLING
We now move on to the third part of the paper, namely
data incest in expectation polling. Unlike previous sec-
tions, the agents no longer are assumed to eliminate
incest at each step. So incest propagates in the network.
Given the incestious beliefs, the aim is to compute the
posterior of the state. We illustrate how the results of
Sec.II can be used to eliminate data incest (and therefore
bias) in expectation polling systems. Recall from Sec.I
that in expectation polling [4], [20], individuals are sam-
pled and asked who they believe will win the election; as
opposed to intent polling where individuals are sampled
and asked who they intend to vote for. The bias of
the estimate from expectation polling depends strongly
on the social network structure. Our approach below is
Bayesian: we compute the posterior and therefore the
conditional mean estimate (see Footnote 5).
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We consider two formulations below:
1) An expectation polling system where in addition
to specific polled voters, the minimal number of
additional voters are recruited. The pollster then
is able to use the incestious beliefs to compute
the posterior conditioned on the observations and
thereby eliminate incest (Sec.IV-A below).
2) An expectation polling system when it is not pos-
sible to recruit additional voters. The pollster then
can only compute the posterior conditioned on the
incestious beliefs. (Sec.IV-B below).
The first approach can be termed as “exact” since
the estimate computed based on the incestious beliefs
is equivalent to the estimate computed based on the
private observations of the sampled voters. The second
approach, although optimal given the available informa-
tion, has a higher variance (see footnote 10).
Suppose X candidates contest an election. Let x ∈
X = {1, 2, . . . , X} denote the candidate that is leading
amongst the voters, i.e., x is the true state of nature.
There are N voters. These voters communicate their
expectations via a social network according to the steps
listed in Protocol 2. We index the voters as nodes
n ∈ {1, . . . , N} as follows: m < n if there exists a
directed path from node m to node n in the directed
acyclic graph (DAG). It is well known that such a
labeling of nodes in a DAG constitute a partially ordered
set. The remaining nodes can be indexed arbitrarily,
providing the above partial ordering holds.
Protocol 2 is similar to Protocol 1, except that voters
exchange their expectations (beliefs) of who the leading
candidate is, instead of recommendations. (So unlike the
previous section, agents do not perform social learning.)
Remark: Similar to Theorem 2.2, the Bayesian update
(20) in Protocol 2 can be viewed as an idealized model;
under assumption (A1) the belief pin increases with
respect to the observation yn (in terms of the monotone
likelihood ratio order). So even if agents are not actually
Bayesian, if they choose their belief to be monotone in
the observation, they mimic the Bayesian update.
A. Exact Incest Removal in Expectation Polling
Assuming that the voters follow Protocol 2, the polling
agency (pollster) seeks to estimate the leading candidate
(state of nature x) by sampling a subset of the N voters.
1) Setup and Aim: Let R = {R1,R2, . . . ,RL}
denote the L− 1 sampled recruited voters together with
node RL that denotes the pollster. For example the
L − 1 voters could be volunteers or paid recruits that
have already signed up for the polling agency. Since,
by Protocol 2, these voters have naively combined the
intentions of their friends (by ignoring dependencies),
Protocol 2 Belief-based Expectation Polling Protocol
1) Intention from Friends: Node n receives the beliefs
{pim,m ∈ Hn} of who is leading from its immedi-
ate friends, namely nodes Hn.
2) Naive Data Fusion: Node n fuses the estimates of
its friends naively (and therefore with incest) as
pin− =
∏
m∈Hn pim
1′X
∏
m∈Hn pim
.
3) Observation: Node n records its private observation
yn from the distribution Biy = P (y|x = i), i ∈ X
of who the leading candidate is.
4) Belief Update: Node n uses yn to update its belief
via Bayes formula:
pin =
Bynpin−
1′XBynpin−
. (20)
5) Node n sends its belief pin to subsequent nodes as
specified by the social network graph.
the pollster needs to poll additional voters to eliminate
incest. Let E denote this set of extra (additional) voters
to poll. Clearly the choice of E will depend on R and
the structure of the social network.
What is the smallest set E of extra voters to poll in
order to compute the posterior P (x|y1, . . . , yRL) of state
x (and therefore eliminate data incest)?
2) Incest Removal: Assume that all the recruited L−1
nodes in R report to a central polling node RL. We
assume that the pollster has complete knowledge of the
network; e.g., in an online social network like Facebook.
Using the formulation of Sec.II-B, the pollster con-
structs the directed acyclic graph Gn = (Vn, En),
n ∈ {1, . . . ,RL}. The methodology of Sec.II-G is
straightforwardly used to determine the minimal set of
extra (additional) voters E . The procedure is as follows:
1) For each n = 1, . . . ,RL, compute the weight vector
wn = T
−1
n−1tn; see (17).
2) The indices of the non-zero elements in wn that are
not in Vn, constitute the minimal additional voters
(nodes) that need to be polled. This is due to the
necessity and sufficiency of (19) in Theorem 2.4.
3) Once the additional voters in E are polled for
their beliefs, the polling agency corrects belief pin
reported by node n ∈ R to remove incest as:
l0n(i) = ln(i) +
∑
m∈E,m<n
wn(m)lm(i). (21)
B. Bayesian Expectation Polling using Incestious Beliefs
Consider Protocol 2. However, unlike the previous
subsection, assume that the pollster cannot sample ad-
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ditional voters E to remove incest; e.g., the pollster is
unable to reach marginalized sections of the population.
Given the incest containing beliefs piR1 , . . . , piRL of
the L recruits and pollster, how can the pollster com-
pute the posterior P (x|piR1 , . . . , piRL) and therefore the
unbiased conditional mean estimate E{x|piR1 , . . . , piRL}
where x is the state of nature10?
1) Optimal (Conditional Mean) Estimation using In-
cestious Beliefs: Define the following notation
piR =
[
piR1 . . . piRL
]′
, lR =
[
lR1 . . . lRL
]′
,
YR =
[
y1 . . . yRL
]′
, o(x) =
[
log bxy1 . . . , log bxyn
]′
Theorem 4.1: Consider the beliefs piR1 , . . . , piRL of
the L recruits and pollster in an expectation poll oper-
ating according to Protocol 2. Then for each x ∈ X, the
posterior is evaluated as
P (x|piR) ∝
∑
YR∈Y
RL∏
m=1
Bxym pi0(x). (22)
Here Y denotes the set of sequences {YR} that satisfy
O o(x) = lR(x)−Oe1l0(x) (23)
where, O = [eR1 eR2 · · · eRL]′ (I −A′)−1.
Recall A is the adjacency matrix and em denotes the unit
RL dimension vector with 1 in the m-th position. 
The above theorem asserts that given the incest con-
taining beliefs of the L recruits and pollster, the posterior
distribution of the candidates can be computed via (22).
The conditional mean estimate or maximum aposteriori
estimate can then be computed as in footnote 5.
C. An extreme example of Incest in Expectation Polling
The following example is a Bayesian version of
polling in a social network described in [20]. We show
that due to data incest, expectation polling can be signif-
icantly biased. Then the methods of Sec.IV-A and IV-B
for eliminating incest are illustrated.
Consider the social network Fig.6 with represents an
expectation polling system. The L − 1 recruited nodes
are denoted as R = {2, 3, . . . , L}. These sampled nodes
report their beliefs to the polling node L + 1. Since
the poll only considers sampled voters, for notational
convenience, we ignore labeling the remaining voters;
therefore Fig.2 only shows L+ 1 nodes.
10The price to pay for not recruiting additional voters is an
increase in variance of the Bayesian estimate. It is clear that
E{x|y1, . . . , yRL} computed using additional voters in Sec.IV-A
has a lower variance (and is thus a more accurate estimator)
than E{x|piR1 , . . . , piRL} since the sigma-algebra generated by
piR1 , . . . , piRL is a subset of that generated by y1, . . . , yRL . Of
course, any conditional mean estimator is unbiased by definition.
An important feature of the graph of Fig.6 is that all
recruited nodes are influenced by node 1. This unduly
affects the estimates reported by every other node. For
large L, even though node 1 constitutes a negligible
fraction of the total number of voters, it significantly
biases the estimate of x due to incest.11
To illustrate an extreme case of bias due to data
incest, suppose that X = {1, 2} (so there are X = 2
candidates). Consider Fig.6 with a total of L = 6
recruited nodes; so R = {2, . . . , 8}. Assume the pri-
vate observations recorded at the nodes 1, 2, . . . , 8 are,
respectively, [2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2]. Suppose the true state
of nature is x = 1, that is, candidate 1 is leading
the poll. The nodes exchange and compute their beliefs
according to Protocol 2. For prior pi0 = [0.5, 0.5]′ and
observation matrix B =
[
0.8 0.2
0.2 0.8
]
, it is easily verified
that pi8(1) = 0.2, pi8(2) = 0.8. That is, even though
all 6 samples recorded candidate 1 as winning (based on
private observations) and the true state is 1, the belief pi8
of the pollster is significantly biased towards candidate 2.
Next, we examine the two methods of incest removal
proposed in Sec.IV-A and Sec.IV-B, respectively. Due
to the structure of adjacency matrix A of the network
in Fig.6, condition (19) does not hold and therefore
exact incest removal is not possible unless node 1 is
also sampled. Accordingly, suppose node 1 is sampled in
addition to nodes {2, . . . , 7} and data incest is removed
via algorithm (21). Then the incest free estimate is
P (x = 1|y1, . . . , y8) = 0.9961.
Finally, consider the case where node 1 cannot be
sampled. Then using (22), the posterior is computed as
P (x = 1|pi8) = 0.5544.
Comparing the three estimates for candidate 1,
namely, 0.2 (naive implementation of Protocol 2 with
incest), 0.9961 (with optimal incest removal), and 0.5544
(incest removal based on pi8), one can see that naive
expectation polling is significantly biased – recall that the
ground truth is that candidate 1 is the winning candidate.
V. REVEALED PREFERENCES AND SOCIAL
LEARNING
A key assumption in the social learning models formu-
lated in this paper is that agents are utility maximizers.
In microeconomics, the principle of revealed preferences
seeks to determine if an agent is an utility maximizer
11In [20] a novel method is proposed to achieve unbiased expectation
polling - weigh the estimate of each node by the reciprocal of its degree
distribution, or alternatively sample nodes with probability inversely
proportional to their degree distribution. Then highly influential nodes
such as node 1 in Fig.6 cannot bias the estimate. Our paper is motivated
by Bayesian considerations where we are interested in estimating the
optimal (conditional mean) estimate which by definition is unbiased.
11
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Fig. 6. Expectation Polling where social network structure can result
in significant bias. Node 1 has undue influence on the beliefs of other
nodes. Node RL = L+1 represents the pollster. Only sampled voters
are shown.
subject to budget constraints based on observing its
choices over time. In this section we will use the
principle of revealed preferences on Twitter datasets to
illustrate social learning dynamics in reputation agencies
as a function of external influence (public belief).
A. Afriat’s Theorem
Given a time-series of data D = {(pit, at), t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , T}} where pit ∈ Rm denotes the public
belief12, at denotes the response of agent, and t denotes
the time index, is it possible to detect if the agent is a
utility maximizer? An agent is a utility maximizer at each
time t if for every public belief pit, the chosen response
at satisfies
at(pit) ∈ arg max
{pi′ta≤It}
u(a) (24)
with u(a) a non-satiated utility function. Nonsatiated
means that an increase in any element of response a
results in the utility function increasing.13 As shown by
Diewert [38], without local nonsatiation the maximiza-
tion problem (24) may have no solution.
In (24) the budget constraint pi′tat ≤ It denotes the
total amount of resources available to the social sensor
for selecting the response x to the public belief pit. In
Sec.V-B, we will interpret this as a social impact budget.
Afriat’s theorem [5], [25] provides a necessary and
sufficient condition for a finite dataset D to have origi-
nated from an utility maximizer.
Theorem 5.1 (Afriat’s Theorem): Given a dataset
D = {(pit, at) : t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}}, the following
statements are equivalent:
1) The agent is a utility maximizer and there exists a
nonsatiated and concave utility function that satis-
fies (24).
12In this section, the public belief is no longer a probability mass
function. Instead it reflects the public’s perception of the reputation
agency based on the number of followers and tweet sentiment.
13The non-satiated assumption rules out trivial cases such as a
constant utility function which can be optimized by any response.
2) For scalars ut and λt > 0 the following set of
inequalities has a feasible solution:
uτ−ut−λtpi′t(aτ−at) ≤ 0 for t, τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}.
(25)
3) A nonsatiated and concave utility function that
satisfies (24) is given by:
u(a) = min
t∈T
{ut + λtpi′t(a− at)} (26)
4) The dataset D satisfies the Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference (GARP), namely for any k ≤
T , pi′tat ≥ pi′tat+1 ∀t ≤ k−1 =⇒ pi′kak ≤ pi′ka1.

As pointed out in [6], an interesting feature of Afriat’s
theorem is that if the dataset can be rationalized by a
non-trivial utility function, then it can be rationalized by
a continuous, concave, monotonic utility function. That
is, violations of continuity, concavity, or monotonicity
cannot be detected with a finite number of observations.
Verifying GARP (statement 4 of Theorem 5.1) on
a dataset D comprising T points can be done using
Warshall’s algorithm with O(T 3) [6], [39] computations.
Alternatively, determining if Afriat’s inequalities (25) are
feasible can be done via a LP feasibility test (using
for example interior point methods [40]). Note that
the utility (26) is not unique and is ordinal by con-
struction. Ordinal means that any monotone increasing
transformation of the utility function will also satisfy
Afriat’s theorem. Therefore the utility mimics the ordinal
behavior of humans, see also Sec.II-E. Geometrically
the estimated utility (26) is the lower envelop of a
finite number of hyperplanes that is consistent with the
dataset D.
B. Example: Twitter Data of Online Reputation Agencies
In this section we illustrate social learning associated
with reputation agencies on Twitter. Content (games,
movies, books) is provided to the reputation agency
which then publishes its review as a tweet. The sentiment
of the tweet and number of followers (reputation) con-
stitute the publicly available information that drives the
social learning process. The Twitter network responds
to the sentiment of the tweet by retweeting. Data incest
information structures arise since if the sentiment of the
tweet published by the reputation agency improves its
reputation, then this reinforces the reputation agency’s
belief that it adequately reviewed the content.
The framework, which is illustrated in Fig.7, involves
utility maximization and dynamics of the public belief,
which we will show (based on Twitter data) evolves
according to an autoregressive process. Specifically the
goal is to investigate how the number of followers and
12
polarity14 affect the time before a retweet occurs and
the total number of associated retweets. Apart from its
relevance to social learning, the information provided
by this analysis can be used in social media marketing
strategies to improve a brand and for brand awareness.
As discussed in [42], Twitter provides a significant
amount of agent-generated data which can be analyzed
to provide novel personal advertising to agents.
Twitter Network
Content
Reputation
Agency
Utility
Maximizer
Social
Learning
pit(2)
at
pit+1(1)
Fig. 7. Schematic of dynamics of the reputation agency and the
Twitter network. The reputation agency receives content (books, games,
movies) which it reviews and publishes tweets at epochs t = 1, 2, . . . ,
with sentiment pit(2). The reputation agency index i has been omitted
for clarity. The public belief pit and response at are defined in Sec.V-B.
1) Twitter Datasets: We consider 9 well known on-
line reputation agencies: @IGN, @gamespot, @Amzn-
MovieRevws, @creativereview, @HarvardBiz, @techre-
view, @pcgamer, @RottenTomatoes, @LAReviewof-
Books. Fig.8 provides the social retweet network which
includes the Twitter accounts of these 9 reputation agen-
cies. The Twitter data was collected on November 17th
2014 at 9:00 pm for a duration of 24 hours. The data was
obtained using the Twitter Streaming API15 and a custom
python script. The sentiment of the tweets and retweets is
computed using TextBlob16. The social network contains
10,656 nodes with 11,054 edges. As illustrated in Fig.8,
numerous nodes retweet based on tweets posted by these
9 agencies. The edge intensity in Fig.8 can be used to
gain intuition on the dynamics of retweets. For the nodes
with high in degree such as @IGN and @HarvardBiz the
retweets typically occur in a short period of time on the
order of 1-12 hours. This behavior has been observed in
popularity dynamics of papers and youtube videos [43]
and is associated with a decrease in the ability to attract
new attention after ageing.
In the following analysis, the aim is to determine
if the Twitter followers of an online reputation agency
14Here polarity [41] is a real valued variable in the interval [-1,1]
and depends on the sentiment of the tweet; that is, whether the tweet
expresses a positive/negative/neutral statement.
15https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
16TextBlob - Python based Text Processing Tool Suit, http://textblob.
readthedocs.org/en/dev/
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Fig. 8. Snapshot of the estimated retweet network obtained
by tracking real-time tweets of reputation agencies. The labels
1, 2, . . . , 9 correspond to the Twitter accounts @IGN, @gamespot,
@AmznMovieRevws, @creativereview, @HarvardBiz, @techreview,
@pcgamer, @RottenTomatoes, @LAReviewofBooks. The data is col-
lected over a period of 24 hours starting from November 17th 2014
at 9:00 pm. The reputation agency nodes are denoted by large circles
and retweeting nodes (followers) by small circles. The sentiment of
the tweet published by the reputation agency is denoted by color: red
is negative, green positive, and gray is neutral. The time of the retweet
is indicated by the shade intensity of the edges of the graph: the lighter
the shade of an edge, the later the retweet was posted.
exhibit utility maximization behavior in response to the
tweet published by the reputation agency. The index
t = 1, 2, . . . , denotes epochs at which the reputation
agency publishes its tweets. 17 To apply Afriat’s theorem
(25), the public belief is defined by
piit = [#followers, neutrality]
for each reputation agency i. The #followers is the
number of followers of a tweet published by the on-
line reputation agency. The neutrality of the tweet
published by the reputation agency is computed as
1/|polarity| where the polarity of a tweet is com-
puted using TextBlob. The associated response taken by
Twitter users that retweet in the network is given by
ait = [∆t,#retweets].
∆t denotes the time between the tweet (published by the
agency) and the first retweet (of a follower). #retweets
denotes the total number of retweets generated by
followers prior to the next tweet from the reputation
agency i. Next we need to justify the linear budget
17The average time interval between tweets for @IGN, @gamespot,
and @HarvardBiz are respectively, 31, 33, and 34 minutes.
13
in (24) to use Afriat’s theorem. It is clear that as the
number of followers of a reputation agency increases,
the number of retweets will increase. Consequently one
expects a decrease in time between the first retweet
at(1) as the number of followers pit(1) increases. The
results in [44] suggest that the higher the polarity of a
tweets published by the reputation agency, the larger the
number of retweets. So we expect that as the neutrality
(i.e. the lower the polarity) of the tweet increases the
resulting number of retweets at(2) will decrease. So it
is reasonable to assume the existence of a social impact
budget It for the utility maximization test (25) which
satisfies It = pi′tat. We construct the datasets Di for
each reputation agency i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 9} from the Twitter
data collected on November 17th 2014 at 9:00 pm for a
duration of 24 hours. The dataset Di = {(piit, ait) : t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , T i}} was constructed using the public belief
piit, response a
i
t, and total number of tweets T
i for the
reputation agency i. Note that t ∈ {1, . . . , T i} denotes
the tweets published by the reputation agency.
2) Results: We found that each of the Twitter datasets
Di satisfy the utility maximization test (25). Using
(26) from Afriat’s Theorem the associated utility func-
tion for the reputation agencies @IGN, @gamespot,
@RottenTomatoes, and @LAReviewBooks is provided
in Fig.9(a)-9(d). The utility function for the other 5 agen-
cies are omitted as only minor differences are present
compared with the utility functions provided in Fig.9.
Several key observations can be made from the results:
(a) Given that Di satisfies (25), this suggests that the
number of followers piit(1) and neutrality pi
i
t(2) of
the tweet contributes to the retweet dynamics (i.e.
the delay before the first tweet ait(1) and the total
number of retweets ait(2)).
(b) The utility functions provided in Fig.9 suggest that
Twitter users prefer to increase the delay of retweet-
ing ait(1) compared with increasing the total number
of retweets ait(2). The results also suggest that
as the delay before the first retweet increases the
associated number of retweets decreases. This effect
is pronounced in Fig.9(d) where the first and only
retweet occurs approximately 2000 seconds after the
original tweet.
(c) The revealed preferences of the reputation agencies,
represented by the utility functions in Fig.9(a)-9(d),
are not identical.
Observation (a) is straightforward as a change in the
number of followers will affect the time of a retweet.
Additionally, as suggested in [44], as neutrality of the
tweet increases the associated total number of retweets
is expected to decrease. Observation (b) illustrates an
interesting characteristic of how users retweet to rep-
utation agencies, it suggests that Twitter users prefer
to increase the time prior to retweeting compared to
increasing the total number of retweets. This result is
caused by social features of users which include the
content of the tweet, and the external context during
which the tweet is posted [45]. In [45] over 250 million
tweets are collected and analyzed and it was found that
a high number of followers does not necessarily lead
to shorter retweet times. A possible mechanism for this
effect is that tweets that are exposed to a larger number
of Twitter users then an individual user is less likely to
retweet–this effect is known as diffusion of responsibility.
For large retweet times ait(1) we observe that the total
number of retweets is significantly reduced compared to
short retweet times, refer to Fig.9(a) and Fig.9(d). This
result has been observed in popularity dynamics [43] and
is associated with an ageing effect–that is, the interest
of the tweet decreases with time. Observation (c) is
expected as different reputation agencies are expected to
have different users retweeting. To quantify this result
for the constructed ordinal (i.e. identical for any mono-
tonic transformation) utility functions the comparison
of preferences is achieved using the marginal rate of
substitution defined by:
MRS12 =
∂u/∂ai(1)
∂u/∂ai(2)
. (27)
In (27), MRS12 defines the amount of ai(2) the Twitter
users are willing to give up for 1 additional unit of ai(1).
From Fig.9(a)-9(d) it is clear that MRS12 > 1 suggesting
users prefer ai(1) compared with ai(2). Additionally
notice that the MRS12 for each of the reputation agencies
in Fig.9(a)-9(d) illustrating that the associated behavior
of each is characteristically different.
3) Social Learning: To interpret the above results in
terms of social learning, we next show that the response
(action) at and public belief pit at epoch t determine the
public belief pit+1 at epoch t + 1. We found that the
following auto-regressive time series model
pit+1(1) = pit(1) + b at(2) + t (28)
driven by a zero mean noise process {t} yields an
excellent fit, where the parameter b is estimated from
the Twitter data using least-squares. Note that pit+1(1)−
pit(1) in (28) models the total number of new followers
resulting from the the total number of retweets at(2).
To test the accuracy of (28), we selected the reputation
agencies @IGN, @gamespot, and @HarvardBiz. The ex-
perimentally measured and numerically predicted results
are displayed in Fig.10. As seen (28) accurately predicts
the public opinion based on the response of the Twitter
users. The mean absolute percentage error using the AR
14
(a) @IGN Twitter account. (b) @gamespot Twitter account.
(c) @HarvardBiz Twitter account. (d) @LAReviewofBooks Twitter
account.
Fig. 9. Estimated utility function u(at) using the Twitter datasets
Di for i ∈ {1, 2, 5, 9} defined in Sec.V-B constructed using the (26)
from Afriat’s Theorem. Note that at(1) is the number of retweets, and
at(2) has units of seconds.
model for the reputation agencies @IGN, @gamespot,
and @HarvardBiz are, respectively, 0.49%, 0.67%, and
0.41%.
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Fig. 10. Accuracy of the AR model (28) for the social learning
dynamics of public belief pit+1(1) of reputation agencies: @IGN,
@gamespot, and @HarvardBiz. The dots represent the actual number
of Twitter followers while the solid line indicates the predicted number
of followers using the AR model. The initial number of followers
at t = 0 is set to zero in the plot. The estimated parameter values
of b in (28) for agencies @IGN, @gamespot, and @HarvardBiz are
respectively: 0.4358, 0.8132, and 0.3825. The average time interval
between tweet epochs t for @IGN, @gamespot, and @HarvardBiz are
respectively: 31, 33, and 34 minutes.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This section illustrates the incest removal algorithm
of social learning Protocol 1 for two different types
of social networks. Then incest removal in expectation
polling is illustrated for these two networks.
A. Social Learning and Incest in Corporate Network
Consider the network of Fig.11 which depicts a cor-
porate social network. Nodes 1 and 10 denote the same
senior level manager. Nodes 2 and 8 denote a mid-
level manager; and nodes 3 and 9 denote another mid-
level manager. The two mid-level managers attend a
presentation (and therefore opinion) by a senior manager
to determine (estimate) a specific parameter x about
the company. Each mid-level manager then makes rec-
ommendations (decisions) and convey these to two of
their workers. These workers eventually report back to
their mid-level managers who in turn report back to the
senior manager. The edge (1, 10) indicates that the senior
manager recalls her decision at node 1 when making her
decision at node 10. Similarly for edges (2,8) and (3,9).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Fig. 11. Social Learning in Corporate Network comprising of higher
level manager, mid level manager and workers. Data incest arises at
nodes 8, 9 and 10.
We ran 1000 independent simulations with the follow-
ing parameters in the social learning Protocol 1: X =
{1, 2, . . . , X}, A = {1, 2, . . . , A}, Y = {1, 2, . . . , Y },
X = 10, A = 10, Y = 20, true state x uniform
on X, prior pi0 uniform on X, observation probabilities
Bx,y ∝ exp− (y−x)
2
2 , and costs c(i, a) = |AX x− a|.
It is clear from Fig.11 that incest arises at nodes
8, 9 and 10 due to multiple information paths. Table
I displays the mean square error (MSE) of the state
estimates computed at these nodes. The incestious esti-
mates were computed using naive data fusion (10). The
incest free estimates were computed using the incest
removal algorithm of Theorem 2.3. It is verified that
the achievability condition of Theorem 2.4 holds; hence
incest can be removed completely given the information
from single hop nodes (immediate friends). Table I
shows that incest removal results in substantially more
accurate estimates, particularly at node 10 which is the
most informed node (since all nodes eventually report to
node 10).
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Node 8 9 10
MSE with incest 0.3666 0.3520 0.3119
MSE with incest
removal 0.2782 0.2652 0.1376
TABLE I
CORPORATE NETWORK OF FIG.11
Node 5 6 7 8 9
MSE with incest 0.3246 0.3420 0.3312 0.3149 0.3134
MSE with incest
removal 0.2799 0.2542 0.2404 0.2267 0.2200
TABLE II
MESH NETWORK OF FIG.12
TABLE III
EFFECT OF INCEST REMOVAL IN SOCIAL LEARNING. THE MEAN
SQUARE ERRORS (MSE) IN THE STATE ESTIMATE WERE OBTAINED
BY AVERAGING OVER 1000 INDEPENDENT SIMULATIONS.
1
2
3 4
5
6 7
8
9
Fig. 12. Social Learning in Mesh Network. Data Incest occurs at
nodes 5, 6, 8 and 9.
B. Social Learning and Incest in Mesh Network
Consider the mesh network depicted in Fig.12 with
parameters identical to the previous example. Incest
arises at nodes 5,6 8 and 9. Also incest propagates to
node 6 from node 5. It is verified that the condition of
Theorem 2.4 holds for the mesh network and so incest
can be completely removed. Table II displays the mean
square error of naive data fusion and incest removal. and
shows that substantial improvements occur in the state
estimate with incest removal.
C. Expectation Polling using Incestious Belief
We illustrate the results of Sec.IV for incest removal
in expectation polling. Consider the network of Fig.11
with the edge (1, 10) omitted. Node 10 denotes the
pollster. Assume the pollster cannot sample node 1 so
that exact data incest removal is impossible. (It can be
verified that the necessary and sufficient condition (19)
of Theorem 2.4 does not hold if node 1 is omitted.)
Given the incestious beliefs (expectations) pim from
the sampled voters m ∈ R, we use the estimator of
Theorem 4.1 to compute the conditional mean estimate
xˆ = E{x|pim,m ∈ R} of the leading candidate.
For the simulation we chose X = {1, 2} (two candi-
dates), prior [0.4, 0.6]′, Y = {1, 2}, B =
[
0.8 0.2
0.2 0.8
]
.
sampled voters R MSE
{8, 9, 10} 0.0250
{4, . . . , 10} 0.0230
{2, . . . , 10} 0.0161
{1, . . . , 10} 0.0118
Naive (incest) 0.0513
TABLE IV
CORPORATE NETWORK OF FIG.11 WITH EDGE (1,10) OMITTED.
sampled voters R MSE
{4, 8, 9} 0,0314
{2, 4, 8, 9} 0.0178
{1, . . . , 9} 0.0170
Naive (incest) 0.0431
TABLE V
MESH NETWORK OF FIG.12
TABLE VI
EFFECT OF INCEST REMOVAL IN EXPECTATION POLLING USING THE
ESTIMATOR (22). THE MEAN SQUARE ERRORS (MSE) IN THE
STATE ESTIMATE WERE OBTAINED BY AVERAGING OVER 1000
INDEPENDENT SIMULATIONS.
Table IV displays the mean square error of xˆ for different
recruited sample setsR. The table also displays the MSE
when all nodes are sampled in which case optimal incest
removal is achieved. These are compared with the naive
incestious estimator using pi10 computed via Protocol 2.
Finally, consider expectation polling of voters in the
mesh network of Fig.12. Table V displays the mean
square errors of the conditional mean estimates for dif-
ferent sampled nodes and the naive incestious estimate.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This paper considered data incest in reputation and
expectation polling systems. In reputation systems, data
incest arose in a multi-agent social learning model.
A necessary and sufficient condition on the adjacency
matrix of the directed graph was given for exact incest
removal at each stage. For expectation polling systems, it
was shown that even if incest propagates in the network,
the posterior of the state can be estimated based on the
incestious beliefs. Finally by analyzing Twitter data sets
associated with several online reputation agencies we
used Afriat’s theorem of revealed preferences to show
utility maximization behavior and social learning. In
future work, it is worthwhile extending the framework
in this paper to active sensing and sequential decision
making. For the case of classical social learning, [46]
deals with sequential quickest detection and stochastic
control. Extending this to data incest information pat-
terns is challenging and non-trivial.
Acknowledgement: The experimental data in Sec.III
was obtained from Dr. Grayden Solman and Prof. Alan
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Kingstone of the Department of Psychology, University
of British Columbia. The experiments were conducted by
them in the fall semester of 2013. The data analysis of
Sec.III and Fig.4 was prepared by Mr. Maziyar Hamdi.
A complete description of our results in the psychology
experiment is in the preprint [37].
APPENDIX
A. Illustrative Example
We provide here an example of the data incest problem
setup of Sec.II. Consider S = 2 two agents with
information flow graph for three time points k = 1, 2, 3
depicted in Fig.13 characterized by the family of DAGs
{G1, . . . , G7}. The adjacency matrices A1, . . . , A7 are
constructed as follows: An is the upper left n × n
submatrix of An+1 and
A7 =

0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Fig. 13. Example of information flow network with S = 2 two agents,
namely s ∈ {1, 2} and time points k = 1, 2, 3, 4. Circles represent
the nodes indexed by n = s + S(k − 1) in the social network and
each edge depicts a communication link between two nodes.
Let us explain these matrices. Since nodes 1 and 2 do
not communicate, clearly A1 and A2 are zero matrices.
Nodes 1 and 3 communicate, hence A3 has a single
one, etc. Note that if nodes 1,3,4 and 7 are assumed
to be the same individual, then at node 7, the individual
remembers what happened at node 5 and node 1, but not
node 3. This models the case where the individual has
selective memory and remembers certain highlights; we
discuss this further in Sec.II-F. From (8) and (9),
H7 = {1, 5, 6}, F7 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
where H7 denotes all one hop links to node 7 while F7
denotes all multihop links to node 7.
Using (7), the transitive closure matrices T1, . . . , T7
are given by: Tn is the upper left n × n submatrix of
Tn+1 and
T7 =

1 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 .
Note that Tn(i, j) is non-zero only for i ≥ j due to
causality since information sent by an agent can only
arrive at another social group at a later time instant. The
weight vectors are then obtained from (18) as
w2 =
[
0
]
, w3 =
[
1 0
]′
, w4 =
[
1 1 0
]′
,
w5 =
[
0 0 1 0
]′
, w6 =
[
0 0 0 1 0
]′
,
w7 =
[−1 0 0 0 1 1]′ .
w2 means that node 2 does not use the estimate from
node 1. This formula is consistent with the constraints
on information flow because the estimate from node 1 is
not available to node 2; see Fig.13. w3 means that node
3 uses estimates from nodes 1; w4 means that node 4
uses estimates only from node 1 and node 2. As shown in
Fig.13, the mis-information propagation occurs at node 7
since there are multiple paths from node 1 to node 7. The
vector w7 says that node 7 adds estimates from nodes
5 and 6 and removes estimates from node 1 to avoid
triple counting of these estimates already integrated into
estimates from nodes 3 and 4. Using the algorithm (18),
incest is completely prevented in this example.
Here is an example in which exact incest removal
is impossible. Consider the information flow graph of
Fig.13 but with the edge between node 1 and node
7 deleted. Then A7(1, 7) = 0 while w7(1) 6= 0, and
therefore the condition (19) does not hold. Hence exact
incest removal is not possible for this case. In Sec.IV we
compute the Bayesian estimate of the underlying state
when incest cannot be removed.
Proof of Theorem 2.2
The proof uses MLR stochastic dominance (defined in
footnote 8) and the following single crossing condition:
Definition A.1 (Single Crossing [35]): g : Y × A →
R satisfies a single crossing condition in (y, a) if
g(y, a) − g(y, a¯) ≥ 0 implies g(y¯, a) − g(y¯, a¯) ≥ 0 for
a¯ > a and y¯ > y. Then a∗(y) = argmina g(y, a) is
increasing in y. 
By (A1) it is verified that the Bayesian update satisfies
Bypi
1′Bypi
≤r By+1pi
1′By+1pi
where ≤r is the MLR stochastic order. (Indeed, the MLR
order is closed under conditional expectation and this is
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the reason why it is widely used in Bayesian analysis.)
By submodular assumption (A2), ca+1 − ca is a vector
with decreasing elements. Therefore
(ca+1 − ca)′ Bypi
1′Bypi
≥ (ca+1 − ca)′ By+1pi
1′By+1pi
Since the denominator is non-negative, it follows that
(ca+1 − ca)′By+1pi ≥ 0 =⇒ (ca+1 − ca)′Bypi ≥ 0.
This implies that c′aBypi satisfies a single crossing con-
dition in (y, a). Therefore an(pi, y) = argmina c
′
aBypi is
increasing in y for any belief pi.
Proof of Theorem 2.3
The local estimate at node n is given by (18), namely,
ln−(i) = w′nl1:n−1(i). (29)
Define R¯piia = logP (a|x = i, pi) and the n − 1 dimen-
sional vector R¯1:n−1(i) =
[
R¯pi1i,a1 R¯
pin−1
i,an−1
]
. From
the structure of transitive closure matrix Tn,
l1:n−1(i) = T ′n−1 R¯1:n−1(i), ln−(i) = t
′
nR¯1:n−1(i)
(30)
Substituting the first equation in (30) into (29) yields
ln−(i) = w′nT
′
n−1 R¯1:n−1(i).
Equating this with the second equation in (30) yields
wn = T
−1
n−1tn. (By Lemma 2.1, Tn−1 is invertible).
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Given n nodes, it is clear from Bayes formula and the
structure of the adjacency matrix A of the DAG that
l1:n(i) = o1:n + e1l0(i) +A
′l1:n(i)
Since I −A is invertible by construction,
l1:n(i) = (I −A′)−1o1:n + (I −A′)−1e1l0(i)
Then lR(i) =
[
eR1 eR2 · · · eRL
]′
l1:n(i) satisfies
(23). Finally P (x|piR) ∝
∑
Y1:n∈Y P (Y1:n|x)pi0(x).
Here Y is the set of n dim. vectors satisfying (23).
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